This past semester I took a philosophy of religion course at Iowa State, and it has really spurred my thinking in a number of areas. I'm fortunate enough to have a mentor at another university with whom I can talk about philosophical issues, and the difficulties associated with being a Christian in the field of philosophy. We've been emailing back and forth recently on the problem of evil, and the following is a bunny trail that I've taken us down concerning the nature of the moral law. The following is an excerpt from my most recent email to him. I thought that some of you might be interested in this stuff.

"You said above regarding moral truths, 'If they are analytic then the moral truths hold in a sense independently of God (just like logical truths).' I'm not sure what exactly you intend by 'independently of God,' but if you intend the mundane definition of independent, i.e. not requiring or relying on something else, then I'm not sure I agree that they (or logical truths) are in that sense independent of God. Maybe it would be helpful to proceed from the case of the logical laws.

"As I understand the term necessary, what is necessarily true is true in all possible worlds. It seems, according to this account of necessity, that the law of contradiction is necessarily true. It is not possible that there is some world in which the law of contradiction does not hold. But in virtue of what is the law of contradiction necessarily true? If the law of contradiction is true in virtue of nothing but itself, what are we to make of the further fact that God is a necessary being? If God necessarily exists, and the law of contradiction is necessarily true, then there is no possible world in which God exists, but the law of contradiction does not hold, or vice versa. Is God then subject to the law? If so, it would seem that his power really is limited after all. It would seem that He can't do logical impossibilities [like make a round square] because he is subject to the law of contradiction. And this doesn't seem right. But suppose that the law of contradiction is true in virtue of God's character; it holds not of itself, but because God is eminently rational--perfectly rational, if I may be so bold. If this is the case, there's no problem with the fact that God is necessary and the further fact that the law of contradiction is necessarily true. And there is also no problem with the fact that he is omnipotent and the further fact that he can't do logical impossibilities (if logical laws are true in virtue of God's character, then of course he can't do logical impossibilities--that would mean he contradicts himself). Perhaps, then, logical laws are true in virtue of God's character (this would make other things make sense, after all).

"Perhaps in this same way, moral truths are necessary truths [that is, there is no possible world in which baby-torture is morally permissible, for example]. Perhaps they are necessarily true in virtue of God's character. The fact that one ought not murder, then, is true because murder is not in keeping with God's character. The moral law (expressed in the decalogue, for the sake of argument) is binding on man, then, not because it is what God commanded, but because the law is in keeping with God's nature--and as human beings, made in the image of God, we are to reflect that image [note that we ought to obey the law because it is God's command--but this is distinct from the reason why it is binding on man]. It would seem, then, that the question, "Is it good because God loves it, or does God love it because it is good?" is the wrong way to ask the question (if, in fact, it is a coherent question at all!). God loves non-maleficence (for example) not because it is good, but because it is in keeping with his nature; and non-maleficence is good not because God loves it, but because it is in keeping with God's nature. And this conception is useful in understanding why ethical objectivism seems to be much more secure, logically speaking, than relativism. It would also explain why every human culture has had a sense of the moral "ought" and why it seems to be the case that there is so much in common among the ethical codes of those various cultures. "Why are we to be good?" Because we are made in God's image. "What is good?" That which is in keeping with the nature of God. And if the foregoing is true, maybe it's the case that moral truths are analytic truths that, far from being independent of God, are exactly dependent on him. Perhaps this would also explain why it seems possible to be morally good (albeit not in an ultimate sense) without concomitant faith in God."

For those of you who are not up on all the philosophical jargon, see the following links--
"Analytic": http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/a4.htm (scroll down in list)
"Law of Contradiction": something cannot both be and not-be the case. The statement, "It is 50 degrees outside" cannot be both true and not-true. Something cannot both exist and not exist.
"Non-maleficence": http://www.jansen.com.au/Dictionary_MO.html (scroll down in list)
"Ethical objectivism": http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_objectivism
"Ethical relativism": http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_relativism